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JUVENILES AND THE DEATH PENALTY-
A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE
Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815 (1988)
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 23, 1983, fifteen-year-old William Wayne Thompson brutally
murdered his former brother-in-law, Charles Keene. From the evidence pre-
sented, it appeared that the act was motivated by Keene's physical abuse of
Thompson's sister. Keene's body was found in the Washita River chained to a con-
crete block. He had been shot twice, once in the head and once in the chest, and his
throat, chest, and abdomen had been slashed.1 Although three others assisted with
the murder, it was Thompson who slashed Keene's body and pulled the trigger on
the gun that inflicted the head wound.2
Pursuant to Oklahoma law,3 Thompson was certified to stand trial as an adult in
Grady County District Court' where he was convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma considered the
circumstances of his crime to be heinous, atrocious, and cruel.'
Thompson's conviction was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Oklahoma.' Thompson based his appeal on the argument that the execution of a
juvenile who was fifteen at the time of the offense would constitute cruel and unu-
sual punishment.7 The court noted that the same argument had been made in Ed-
dings v. State,8 and that the Eddings court had unanimously rejected it.' The
Thompson court held that "[u]pon reconsideration of the issue, we reaffirm our
previous holding that once a minor is certified to stand trial as an adult, he may
also, without violating the Constitution, be punished as an adult."'"
On November 9, 1987, counsel for Thompson argued before the United States
Supreme Court that it was "cruel and unusual" punishment for a state to execute a
person who was a juvenile at the time he committed his crime. On June 29, 1988,
a plurality of the Supreme Court agreed with Thompson, holding that the "cruel
and unusual punishment" laws of the eighth amendment, applicable to the states
1. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 860-61 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. Id.
3. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112(b) (West 1987).
4. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 724 P.2d 780, 782 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), vacated, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
5. Id. at 785.
6. Id. at 786.
7. Id. at 784.
8. 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
9. Id. at 1166-67. The Court based its decision on the fact that the death penalty is neither cruel nor unusual
when applied to minors who are certified to stand trial as adults. Thompson, 724 P.2d at 784.
10. Thompson, 724 P.2d at 784 (citing Eddings, 616 P.2d 1159).
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through the fourteenth amendment, "prohibit the execution of a person who was
under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense."11
II. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT:
THE SUPREME COURT'S STRUGGLE WITH THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
When the drafters of the Constitution included the "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" clause in the eighth amendment, they did not attempt to define its precise
boundaries.1 There is little evidence of the Framers' intent in placing the "cruel
and unusual punishment" clause among the restraints enumerated in the Bill of
Rights. 13 From the evidence that is available, it appears that the eighth amendment
was intended to be a limitation upon legislative power. It was to serve as a "consti-
tutional check" which would restrain the otherwise uncontrolled legislative
power.14 Nevertheless, as stated by Justice Brennan in Furman v. Georgia, "we
cannot now know exactly what the Framers thought 'cruel and unusual punish-
ments' were."18
This uncertainty was evidenced in the decisions of the Supreme Court prior to
Weems v. United States. 16 Some of these early decisions compare the punishments
in question to punishments that were considered "cruel and unusual" at the time of
the adoption of the Bill of Rights."
When Weems was decided in 19 10, the Court rejected the "historical" interpre-
tation of the eighth amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" clause. 8 The
Court not only recognized the clause as an exercise of restraint on the legislature, 9
but also recognized that it was the Court's responsibility to make certain the pro-
tections guaranteed by the eighth amendment were enforced.2
Forty-eight years after Weems, the Court addressed the issue once again in Trop
v. Dulles. 2 In Trop, stating that the eighth amendment would be interpreted by the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"22 the
Supreme Court established that it would interpret the "cruel and unusual" clause of
the eighth amendment; however, the Court did not develop any specific guidelines
for interpreting the clause.
11. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
12. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910).
13. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 260-61 (Brennan, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 263 (Brennan, J., concurring).
16. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878);
Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1867).
17. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,369-70 (1910).
18. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 266 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 267 (Brennan, J., concurring).
20. Id.
21. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
22. Id. at 101.
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In 1972 the Court decided Furman v. Georgia,23 in which it gave extensive treat-
ment to the issue of capital punishment while nonetheless leaving many questions
unanswered. The Court ruled that the death penalty was unconstitutional as ap-
plied to the particular cases then being considered but did not determine that the
death penalty was unconstitutional for all crimes or all circumstances .24 Even with
the numerous opinions contained in the Furman decision, the main theme of each
opinion was the arbitrary, random, and discriminately selective manner in which
the death penalty was applied. The Furman decision focused on the unlimited and
uncontrolled discretion that juries had in imposing the death penalty and held that
the death penalty was not to be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
25
This theme provided the basis for guiding the United States Supreme Court in de-
ciding post-Furman capital punishment cases.26
The next Supreme Court case analyzing the constitutionality of the death pen-
alty was Gregg v. Georgia,27 decided in 1976. In Gregg, a plurality of the Court
held that the death penalty is not a per se violation of the eighth amendment. 28 The
Georgia legislature had amended its death penalty statute in order to comply with
the Furman decision.2 9 Noting that the statute provided a bifurcated system that
allowed careful consideration of the circumstances of the crime and of the charac-
ter of the offender, the Court held that the carefully drafted statute adequately dealt
with the concerns of Furman. 0
In 1978, a plurality of the Court in Lockett v. Ohio 31 held that the defendant
must be afforded individualized consideration of any mitigating factors concern-
ing his crime before he can be sentenced to death. The plurality held that the eighth
23. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Prior to Furman, the Supreme Court in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459 (1947), declared that the eighth amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" clause was applicable
and binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 463.
24. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, recognized principles that es-
tablished guidelines for the Court to follow in determining whether a challenged penalty is unconstitutional. Id.
at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring). "The primary principle is that punishment must not be so severe as to be de-
grading to the dignity of human beings." Id. at 271. The second is "that the State must not arbitrarily inflict a
severe punishment." Id. at 274. The third "is that a severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary
society." Id. at 277. The last principle is that "unusually severe and degrading punishment may not be excessive in
view of the purposes for which it is inflicted." Id. at 300.
25. Id. at 248 n. II (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 314 (White, J., concurring); see id. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring).
26. But cf McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated sub nom. Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941
(1972), where the Court, writing only one year before Furnan, upheld two statutes as constitutional in applying
the death penalty. The first statute allowed ajury to apply the death penalty without the use of any standard guide-
lines. The Court held that the absence of standards did not violate due process. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 196. The
second was Ohio's single verdict procedure for determining guilt and punishment. Id. at 208-09.
27. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
28. Id. at 169 (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion).
29. Id. at 162 (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion). The Legislature set up a bifurcated system
with a trial at one stage and determination of the penalty during the second. Id. at 162-63 (Stewart, Powell,
Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion). At least one often aggravating circumstances listed in the statute must be found
before the death penalty may be imposed. Id. at 165-66 n.9 (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion)
(citing GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (Supp. 1975)); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1990).
30. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07; see id. at 222 (White, J., concurring).
31. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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and fourteenth amendments require that in all capital cases the sentencer must not
be prevented from hearing any mitigating factors, such as characteristics of the
defendant or circumstances of the offense. The statute involved in Lockett limited
the types of mitigating circumstances allowed to be considered at sentencing and
was therefore held unconstitutional.32
In Eddings v. Oklahoma,33 the Supreme Court first considered the specific issue
of the constitutionality of the imposition of the death penalty upon a minor who
was under the age of sixteen when he committed his crime. The petitioner in Ed-
dings was sixteen years old at the time of his offense but was tried as an adult. The
trial court convicted Eddings of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death
for killing a police officer.34 The Supreme Court reversed the decision on the
ground that the "sentence was imposed without the type of individualized consid-
eration of mitigating factors ...required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments in capital cases."35
The interesting twist in Eddings is the Court's decision of an issue entirely dif-
ferent from the one upon which certiorari was granted .36 The petitioner's claim
was not presented to the Oklahoma courts and, furthermore, was raised for the
first time in the petitioner's brief to the United States Supreme Court. 37 The deci-
sion in Eddings allowed the Supreme Court to avoid deciding the specific issue of
the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied to a minor under sixteen years
of age at the time of the commission of his crime. Until its decision in Thompson,
the Court considered the age of the petitioner as a mitigating factor rather than
establishing an age below which no juvenile could be sentenced to death.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to give a definite and concrete defini-
tion of the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause, but it has recognized principles
to guide the determination of the constitutionality of a punishment when chal-
lenged as a violation of the clause." The Court utilized several of these principles
in deciding Thompson.
III. WILLIAM WAYNE THOMPSON: THE EXCEPTION BECOMES THE RULE
On June 29, 1988, the Court held that age would no longer be only a mitigating
factor which could relieve a minor under sixteen of a death sentence.3 9 Instead, the
32. Id. at 608; seealso Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 642 (1978) (Ohio statute prohibited any mitigating factors
other than those specifically listed).
33. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
34. Id. at 109.
35. Id. at 105 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
36. Id. at 120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (The Court "took care to limit [its] consideration to whether the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the imposition of a death sentence on an offender because he was 16
years old in 1977 at the time he committed the offense .... Id.).
37. Id.
38. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment of Juveniles, 34 CLEV. ST. L. RaV. 363 (1986)
[hereinafter Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment ofJuveniles]; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
39. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
[Vol. 10:2
JUVENILES AND THE DEA TH PENALTY
Court prohibited execution of a minor who was under sixteen at the time of the
commission of the crime.4"
The issue of capital punishment has sparked a vigorous and heated debate in our
nation, and, as long as juries are armed with the possible imposition of the death
penalty, the debate is not likely to subside. The issue of capital punishment has
separated legal scholars, religious leaders, politicians, judges, lawyers, and the
American public. The Supreme Court Justices who decided Thompson were no
exception. Of the eight Justices who took part in the decision, only four joined the
plurality opinion.41
A. Plurality Opinion
The plurality acknowledged that the drafters of the eighth amendment made no
attempt to explicitly define "cruel and unusual punishment," and that it was up to
the Court to make such a determination.42 The plurality turned to the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"' and, in deter-
mining this "standard of decency," the plurality chose to review legislative enact-
ments and jury determinations." The plurality stated that it would "explain why
these indicators of contemporary standards of decency confirm our judgment that
such a young person is not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can
justify the ultimate penalty."4"
Not surprisingly, the plurality focused first on the difference between the legal
rights and duties of children and those of adults. It noted various statutes which
treat children differently from adults; for example, "a minor is not eligible to vote,
to sit on a jury, to marry without parental consent, or to purchase alcohol or ciga-
rettes."46 The plurality did recognize that a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old could,
under special circumstances, stand trial as an adult in Oklahoma;47 however, the
plurality found no other Oklahoma statutes that treat a minor under sixteen "as
anything but a 'child.' "' The plurality placed great emphasis on the fact that no
state having legislation that addresses the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdic-
tion has allowed that age to fall below sixteen.'
40. Id. at 838 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
41. Id. at 817. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in the
opinion. The one Justice who took no part in the decision was Justice Kennedy. He has been labeled a conserva-
tive who approves the death penalty. If the issue was to go before the Court again, his vote could change the
outcome.
42. Id. at 821 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
43. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion)).
44. Id. at 821-22 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
45. Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (White, J.,
plurality opinion) (Where a plurality of the Court stated that "[tihe Constitution contemplates that in the end our
own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment." Id. at 597.).
46. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see also id. app. at 839-48.
47. Id. at 824 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112(b) (West 1987).
48. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
49. Id.
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The plurality reviewed various states' statutes authorizing capital punishment
and found that nineteen states approve of the death penalty but have set no mini-
mum age;50 eighteen states have established a minimum age, 1 and fourteen states
do not allow capital punishment at all. 2 Looking at this data, the plurality empha-
sized the fact that all eighteen states which have established a minimum age for the
imposition of the death penalty require the individual to have reached at least six-
teen when the offense was committed. 3 The plurality also noted that professional
organizations such as the American Bar Association and the American Law Insti-
tute are opposed to executing juveniles.5 4 The plurality recognized as well the
large number of European countries that have either abolished the death penalty
altogether or prohibited its application to juveniles. 5
The plurality also looked to the behavior ofjuries, first noting that the fear of an
arbitrary and infrequent method of issuing the sentence of death was the underly-
ing basis which evoked the declaration in Furman that the administration of the
death penalty without proper guidelines was unconstitutional. 6 Relying on infor-
mation compiled by a scholar, 7 the plurality noted that apparently between eight-
een and twenty executions of juveniles under age sixteen have taken place in this
country, the last of these occurring in 1948.58 Considering this decline in the exe-
cution of minors, along with the thousands of murder cases that are tried each
year, the plurality concluded that the penalty as applied to "a 15-year-old offender
is now generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community." 9
Department of Justice statistics show that from 1982 through 1986, 82,094
people were arrested for willful criminal homicide.60 Out of this group, 1,393
were sentenced to death, but only five were younger than sixteen at the time of the
commission of the offense.61 The plurality admitted that these statistics can be in-
50. Id. at 826-28 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (statutory references contained therein). The states which
approve the death penalty with no minimum age are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 828 n.26
51. Id. at 829-30 n.30 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (statutory references contained therein). Those states
establishing a minimum age are: California (age 18), Colorado (age 18), Connecticut (age 18), Georgia (age 17),
Illinois (age 18), Indiana (age 16), Kentucky (age 16), Maryland (age 18), Nebraska (age 18), Nevada (age 16),
New Hampshire (indicating 18-the age of majority), New Jersey (age 18), New Mexico (age 18), North Caro-
lina (age 17), Ohio (age 18), Oregon (age 18), Tennessee (age 18), and Texas (age 17). Id.
52. Id. at 826-28 n.25 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (statutory references contained therein). The states not
allowing capital punishment are: Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
53. Id. at 829 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
54. Id. at 830 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
55. Id. at 830-31 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). The United Kingdom and New Zealand do not allow execu-
tion of juveniles; West Germany, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries have totally
abolished the death penalty; Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland only allow the death penalty for exceptional
crimes, such as treason; juvenile executions are also not permitted in the Soviet Union. Id.
56. Id. at 831 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
57. See V. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES, 190-208 (1987).
58. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 832-33 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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terpreted differently, "but they do suggest that these five young offenders have re-
ceived sentences that are 'cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual.' "62 This statement reflects the plurality's view that
the statistics show that the death penalty is being applied to juveniles in an arbi-
trary and infrequent manner.
The plurality acknowledged that all the factors previously mentioned are im-
portant considerations as to whether the punishment is unconstitutional and also
declared that the issue of unconstitutionality is for the Court to ultimately decide.
In making that final determination, the plurality stated two factors to consider: (1)
"whether [a] juvenile's culpability should be measured by the same standard as
that of an adult"63 and (2) whether the death penalty as applied to juveniles" 'mea-
surably contributes' to the social purposes that are served by the death penalty."64
Justice Stevens stressed the difference between juvenile and adult culpability,
concluding that juveniles are less mature and responsible than adults.65 The basis
for this conclusion, as stated by the plurality, is that "[i]nexperience, less educa-
tion, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences
of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be moti-
vated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult."66
Relying on Gregg v. Georgia,67 the plurality recognized two principal social
purposes that the death penalty serves: retribution and deterrence .68 Considering
the lesser culpability, the capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary obligations
to minors, the plurality then stated that execution of a fifteen-year-old was "inap-
plicable" to the principle of retribution." The plurality concluded that the deter-
rence rationale was also "inapplicable" to such young offenders.7" The plurality
also noted that ninety-eight percent of the arrests for willful homicide involved of-
fenders over sixteen years of age and that removing those under sixteen from the
possibility of receiving the death penalty would have no diminishing effect on the
potential class of offenders.71 Accordingly, those under sixteen would not be de-
terred because it is very unlikely that a minor under sixteen would make the "cost-
benefit" analysis necessary to the operation of the deterrence principle. 72
Therefore, according to the plurality, the execution of minors who were under the
age of sixteen at the time of the commission of the crime is" 'nothing more than
62. Id. at 833 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Ste-
wart, J., concurring)).
63. Id. at 833 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 835 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
66. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
67. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
68. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (Stewart,
Powell, Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion)).
69. Id. at 836-37 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
70. Id. at 837.
71. Id. at 837 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
72. Id.
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the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering . . . . , 3 It is,
therefore, unconstitutional.
B. Concurring Opinion
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed that there is some age be-
low which ajuvenile cannot be punished by death in accordance with the Constitu-
tion. She also agreed that the Court is required to determine this age "in light of the
'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' ""
However, she contended that since there is insufficient evidence to establish a "rel-
evant social consensus," the Court should be "reluctant to adopt this conclusion as
a matter of constitutional law . . . . "
Justice O'Connor's disagreement with the plurality arises from the ambiguous
inferences that can be drawn from the data of the nineteen states that have autho-
rized the death penalty without setting an age limit for its application. If the con-
clusion could be reached that the nineteen states had deliberately chosen to
authorize the death penalty for minors under sixteen, a national consensus reject-
ing the death penalty would not exist. According to Justice O'Connor, this conclu-
sion cannot be reached without speculation.76 She stated that the legislatures of
those nineteen states may have authorized a juvenile's being tried as an adult for
other reasons and that the legislatures possibly had not even considered that the
juveniles might be punished by death.77 In light of these considerations it does not
follow that the nineteen states deliberately authorized the death penalty for minors
under age sixteen. 78
Justice O'Connor discussed some of the reasons that juveniles may be trans-
ferred into the adult criminal system. One such reason is the length of confinement
available in the juvenile justice system. 79 Considering that most states lose juris-
diction of juveniles between the ages of sixteen through eighteen, the juvenile sys-
tem might be inappropriate for serious offenders. In addition, state legislatures
may not want to confine serious offenders of any age in the same institutions that
house their more vulnerable minor offenders.8" O'Connor pointed out that these
reasons suggest nothing about the legislature's consideration of the appropriate-
ness of the death penalty for minors under sixteen.81 Nevertheless, the fact that
nineteen states and the federal government have legislation that appears to have
73. Id. at 838 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion)).
74. Id. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 848-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor concedes that there is strong evidence toward
a national consensus rejecting execution ofjuveniles who were under sixteen when the crime was committed, but
contends that it is difficult to comprehend that a national consensus exists with only two-thirds of the states op-
posed to capital punishment of such juveniles. Id.
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the legal effect of authorizing the death penalty as applied to juveniles is "a real
obstacle in the way of concluding that a national consensus forbids this practice."82
Justice O'Connor argued that the execution and sentencing statistics lack im-
portant data, such as how many times juries have been asked to impose the death
penalty on a defendant under sixteen years of age and how often these decisions
have been the result of prosecutorial discretion.8 3 Without this data, it is difficult
to deduce anything except thatjuries are reluctant to impose the ultimate penalty of
death upon a juvenile. 4
According to Justice O'Connor, the plurality did not demonstrate that those un-
der age sixteen are "inherently incapable" of being deterred by the threat of the
possible imposition of the death penalty." The plurality noted that deterrence is
not effective in this situation since ninety-eight percent of those arrested for willful
homicide are over sixteen years of age.8 6 Accordingly, excluding the young of-
fender from the class that is eligible for the death penalty will not diminish the de-
terrence value for the ninety-eight percent of offenders over sixteen years of age.87
This reasoning does not support a conclusion that capital punishment has no deter-
rence value for offenders fifteen years of age; it only supports the proposition that
excluding those under sixteen will not diminish the deterrence value for the
ninety-eight percent over the age of sixteen.
Justice O'Connor emphasized that Oklahoma has a statute authorizing the
death penalty without establishing any minimum age. 8 In addition, Oklahoma
has a statute authorizing the transfer of fifteen-year-old murder defendants to adult
criminal proceedings in some circumstances.8 9 This, according to Justice O'Con-
nor, poses the risks either that Oklahoma did not realize that fifteen-year-olds
would be subjected to death or that Oklahoma did not give this question serious
consideration before authorizing the death penalty. " If it was clear that there exists
no national consensus against imposing the death penalty upon minors, Oklaho-
ma's statute would not be problematic.91 Here, however, Oklahoma has estab-
lished a statutory system, and "they have done so without the earmarks of careful
consideration that we have required for other kinds of decisions leading to the
death penalty."92
82. Id. at 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 837.
87. Id. at 837 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
88. Id. at 857.
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Relying on the familiar principal that the Court should avoid unnecessarily
broad constitutional adjudication,93 Justice O'Connor concluded "that petitioner
and others who were below the age of 16 at the time of their offense may not be
executed under the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no mini-
mum age at which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's exe-
cution."94 Her decision would leave the broader eighth amendment issue to those
best suited to address it: "the people's elected representatives. " "
C. Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting, Justice Scalia found no "plausible basis" for concluding that "no
criminal so much as one day under 16, after individuated consideration of his cir-
cumstances, including the overcoming of a presumption that he should not be tried
as an adult, can possibly be deemed mature and responsible enough to be punished
with death for any crime."96 According to Justice Scalia, Thompson was not a ju-
venile who unknowingly slipped through the system and found himself confronted
with the sentence of death.97 Rather, Thompson was given, not one, but two op-
portunities of individualized consideration before receiving the death penalty. The
first occurred before he was transferred from the juvenile system; the second came
at his trial when the jury considered his young age before imposing the death pen-
alty.
98
Justice Scalia noted that the plurality rested its conclusion on the theory that
executing a minor under sixteen is "contrary to the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."99 Justice Scalia looked to legislative
enactments as the "most reliable" objective indicators of how a society views a
punishment. He first looked to federal legislation, specifically the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984.100 Congress lowered from sixteen to fifteen the age at
which a juvenile can be transferred from juvenile court to federal district court."'o
As Justice Scalia noted, the fact that Congress had not specifically addressed the
93. Id. at 858 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
94. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 858-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 863.
98. Id. at 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia effectively restated the appalling circumstances and facts of the
crime along with Thompson's previous background. Scalia also noted that the age of executing juveniles had been
discussed in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England. See 4 W. BLACKS'TONE, COMMENTARIES 22-24; 1
M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 25-28 (1682); Streib, Death Penalry for Children: The American Experience with
Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613 (1983) [hereinafter
Streib, Death Penalry for Children] (children under age seven were conclusively presumed to be incapable of crim-
inal intent; from age seven to fourteen there was a rebuttable presumption of inability of criminal intent; over age
fourteen there was no presumption. Id. at 614-15.).
99. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 864-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(Warren, C.J., plurality opinion)).
100. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
101. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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penalty of death for these juveniles does not change what the law on its face now
permits. 0 2
The dissenters considered state legislation and noted a trend toward lowering
the age at which juveniles can be transferred to the adult system.103 According to
Justice Scalia, the majority of the thirty-seven states that allow capital punishment
have not set an age limit, but instead allow the age at which a juvenile can receive
the death penalty to be the same as the age at which the juvenile can be transferred
to the adult system.10 4 Therefore, considering the federal legislation and the nine-
teen states that allow those under sixteen to receive the death penalty, there can be
no societal consensus against those under sixteen receiving the death penalty.
Justice Scalia addressed the plurality's reliance on "the behavior of juries.""'
According to the plurality, there has been a drastic decline in executions of juve-
niles in this century.106 The dissenters stated that there are many reasons, other
than societal consensus against the execution of minors, which explain the decline
in executions. Among these reasons are reduction of public support for the death
penalty and the now mandatory individualized sentencing determinations,' °7
rather than automatic death sentences. Therefore, a society that is generally less
willing to impose the death penalty, coupled with the required individualized con-
siderations, will rarely execute a minor. Accordingly, Justice Scalia said these sta-
tistics show only that society feels that executing a minor under sixteen should be
rare. 0 8 The statistics do not, however, provide a rational basis for concluding that
a societal consensus demands that execution of a juvenile should never occur. 09
Justice Scalia discussed the imposition of capital punishment in other classes,
such as women and offenders seventeen and eighteen years of age. 1 0 He noted a
similar decline and rarity of death sentences for these offenders. 1 Accordingly, if
the reasoning adopted by the plurality is plausible, the same judgment should be
extended to women and those seventeen or eighteen years of age.112 Justice Scalia
criticized the plurality for acting in accordance with its own views. He criticized
the plurality's rationale for concluding that there is a national consensus and stated
that "there is no clear line here, which suggests that the plurality is inappropriately
acting in a legislative rather than a judicial capacity."113
102. Id. at 866.
103. Id. at 867 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 869 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 869 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (making it a constitutional requirement that individu-
alized consideration be given the capital offender at his sentencing hearing, including all relevant circumstances
of the crime and characteristics of the offender, offered to mitigate the punishment to a lesser penalty than death).
108. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 870. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 871 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 872 (Scalia, ., dissenting).
112. Id. at 871-72 (Scalia, . dissenting).
113. Id. at 872 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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IV. SUPPORTING THE PLURALITY'S DECISION
A. Drawing the Line: A National Consensus
To begin the discussion of the Court's judicial power to draw the line at age six-
teen, it seems appropriate to quote language directly from the case:
Thus, in confronting the question whether the youth of the defendant -more specifi-
cally, the fact that he was less than 16 years old at the time of his offense - is a suffic-
ient reason for denying the State the power to sentence him to death, we first review
relevant legislative enactments, then refer to jury determinations, and finally explain
why these indicators of contemporary standards of decency confirm our judgment
that such a young person is not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that
can justify the ultimate penalty.' 14
Considering this language, it seems reasonable to conclude that the plurality
based its conclusion on the lesser culpability of a juvenile rather than on any "na-
tional consensus." The plurality did not claim that there was a national consensus
among the states against executing a minor under sixteen. By placing so much em-
phasis on the lack of a "national consensus," both Justice O'Connor and Justice
Scalia failed to recognize that the plurality used legislative statistics as a guiding
factor rather than as the basis for its decision.
It has been recognized that the Court will be the final authority on the accept-
ability of the death penalty."'5 Although legislative enactments weigh heavily in
the determination, the Court is the ultimate decision maker. 6 In Gregg, Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens noted that "it is evident that legislative judgments
alone cannot be determinative of Eighth Amendment standards since that Amend-
ment was intended to safeguard individuals from the abuse of legislative
power."1 7 In Thompson, the plurality stated that it still had to make the final deci-
sion and, in doing so, placed emphasis upon the juvenile's culpability and whether
the death penalty as applied to minors" 'measurably contributes' to the social pur-
poses that are served by the death penalty." '
In other words, the plurality's determination was not limited necessarily to
finding a national consensus; the plurality used recognized principles in interpret-
ing the eighth amendment challenge before it. Furthermore, although the concur-
ring opinion in Gregg recognized that judges have a limited role to play in
interpreting the eighth amendment,' 19 it further stated that "[tlhis does not mean
114. Id. at 822-23 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted).
115. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (White, J.,
plurality opinion).
116. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.,
plurality opinion).
117. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174 n. 19 (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion).
118. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798).
119. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174-76 (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion).
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that judges have no role to play, for the Eighth Amendment is a restraint upon the
exercise of legislative power."12
It would be implausible to suggest that the Court, after declaring a particular
punishment unconstitutional and acting fully within recognized principles for de-
termining the validity of a punishment under the eighth amendment, would have
to depend upon the legislature to enact the proper statutes in order to give legal
meaning to the Court's decision. The eighth amendment is recognized as a limita-
tion upon the legislatures, and in this delicate situation the Court must be the inter-
preter of the Constitution.121 The Court, in interpreting, must be able to draw
impermeable boundary lines in order to keep the legislature from infringing upon
constitutionally-protected rights.
The basis for the criticisms of the Court's acting in a legislative manner stems
from the case of Ashwander v. TVA. 122 In Ashwander, Justice Brandeis set out in
his concurring opinion the rules the Court has developed to avoid deciding many
of the constitutional questions brought before the Court. 123 The emerging principle
is that the Court will narrow its decision of a constitutional issue as much as the
facts allow and will avoid a constitutional question altogether if another indepen-
dent basis for the decision is available.
Another consideration in the analysis of judicial line-drawing is the deference
given to the legislature. In Ashwander it was noted that, because of the respect ac-
corded to the legislature by the Court, any statutes or laws that are passed carry a
presumption of constitutional validity.124 In Weems v. United States,"12' the Court
noted that great respect and deference would be given to the legislature to define
crimes and their punishment. The Court refused to assert judgment against the
legislature "unless that power encounters in its exercise a constitutional prohibi-
tion."'26 The Court further stated that the legislature has no limitations, except
constitutional ones, and it is the role of the judiciary to decide constitutional limi-
tations.127
With respect to the instant case, Oklahoma has a statute that allows juveniles to
be transferred and tried as adults for certain crimes - such as murder - thereby
subjecting those juveniles to the possibility of punishment by death. If punishment
by death of a person under sixteen is determined to be unconstitutional, the Court
is justified in striking down legislation that allows this constitutionally prohibited
punishment.
120. Id. at 174 (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion).
121. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
122. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
123. Id. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
124. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 355 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat)
213, 270 (1827) (Washington, J., dissenting)); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 718
(1878).
125. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
126. Id. at 378.
127. Id. at 379.
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Justices O'Connor and Scalia have criticized the plurality for acting in a legisla-
tive rather than a judicial capacity, but both have failed to realize that the Court
was acting pursuant to its interpretation of the eighth amendment in drawing the
line at age sixteen. It is up to the Court to determine what constitutes "cruel and
unusual punishment."' 28 It would be implausible to contend that because the
Court's interpretation of the "cruel and unusual punishment" analysis involved a
statute it would have to defer to legislative action.
In Solem v. Helm,'29 the Court discussed the issue of judicial line-drawing, not-
ing that line-drawing is not unique to eighth amendment situations and stating that
courts are called upon to draw lines in a variety of other contexts. 3 ' Referring to
Baldwin v. New York, 3' the Court pointed to the right to a jury trial as just one ex-
ample.
In Baldwin the Court determined that where the defendant may be imprisoned
for more than six months, he has a right to a jury trial.132 The Court, in drawing
this line at six months, relied on the fact that only New York City denied the right
to a jury trial for offenses punishable by more than six months.' 33 According to
Justice White, "[tihis near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us with the
only objective criterion by which a line could ever be drawn -on the basis of the
possible penalty alone-between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'se-
rious' for purposes of trial by jury."134 As stated in Solem, Baldwin established that
the Court can distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another and, more
importantly, that "courts properly may look to the practices in other jurisdictions
in deciding where lines between sentences should be drawn." '3
Solem is directly analogous to the analysis the plurality used in Thompson in
drawing the line of the constitutionality of executing minors at age sixteen. To ar-
rive at the age of sixteen, the Thompson plurality compared statutes of all the dif-
ferent states. 36 The Court was asked to extend this line to eighteen but declined to
do so, limiting its decision to the facts of the case. By narrowing its decision of the
constitutional issue as much as the facts allowed, the Court complied with the
principles expressed in Ashwander. 13 1 In drawing the line at sixteen, the plurality
was properly exercising judicial authority in interpreting the eighth amendment,
128. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821-22 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
129. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
130. Id. at 294.
131. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
132. Id. at 69 (White, J., plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 71-72 (White, J., plurality opinion).
134. Solem, 463 U.S. at 295 (quoting Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 72-73 (White, J., plurality opinion)).
135. Id.
136. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
137. 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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declaring the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to minors, and comparing
the practices in various states in determining where to draw the line. 138
B. Legislative Enactments and Jury Verdicts
Although the Thompson Court was not required to find a national consensus,
there is a strong indication of a trend toward a consensus favoring exclusion of mi-
nors under the age of sixteen from the imposition of the death penalty. The plural-
ity recognized that fourteen states prohibit capital punishment139 and that eighteen
states have established a minimum age below which it is impermissible to execute
anyone. Of these eighteen states, only one sets the age at sixteen; none permit the
execution of a minor under sixteen, and the remainder have established the age at
seventeen or eighteen.140
The plurality then recognized that professional organizations such as the Amer-
ican Bar Association and the American Law Institute are opposed to executing ju-
veniles. 41 The Model Penal Code provides additional support: " '[Clivilized
societies will not tolerate the spectacle of execution of children.' "'42 Sharing this
opinion are the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, the
Washington Post, the United Nations, Pope John Paul II, and more than three-
fourths of the nations of the world, including all of the European countries, 143 and,
specifically, the Soviet Union."
Justice Scalia, in his criticism of the plurality, stated that there was a "common-
law understanding that 15-year-olds were not categorically immune from com-
mission of capital crimes." 4 ' It is well accepted that this country adopted its
common law from England. Additionally, it is generally accepted that minors can
commit and be convicted of capital crimes, but it does not necessarily follow that
they should also receive the death penalty.
138. See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ("whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry"); cf Brilmayer, Caro/ene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the 'Inside-Out-
sider,' 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1291 (1986). See generally Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors: An Eighth
Amendment Analysis, 74 J. CiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1471, 1504 n. 190 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Capital
Punishment for Minors] (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Mur-
gia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam)) ("Age is not a suspect classification" in fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection issues; therefore, punishing minors and adults differently poses no fourteenth amendment problems.).
Accordingly, "different treatment based on age will not violate the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational
basis for the distinction. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312, 314." Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors, at 1504
n. 190. Considering that juveniles are less culpable than adults, there is a rational basis for the distinction. Juve-
niles may not be adequately protected by the representatives of the people, the legislatures; juveniles have no
vote, no power to contract, and are treated differently than adults in many different legal contexts. Therefore, "[i]t
seems inconsistent that one be denied the fruits of the tree of the law, yet subjected to all of its thorns." Workman
v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W. 2d 374, 377 (Ky. 1968).
139. See supra note 52 for a list of states prohibiting capital punishment.
140. See supra note 51.
141. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
142. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment ofJuveniles, supra note 38, at 388 (quoting MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.6 commentary at 133 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980)).
143. Id. at 388-89.
144. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
145. Id. at 864 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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According to research that was performed at England's Old Bailey in London, it
was "revealed that over 100 youths had been sentenced to death from 1801-1836
but none had actually been executed . . . . While some cases do exist, it appears
settled that execution of youths was never common in England, at any time."
1
6
Furthermore, execution of minors under the age of sixteen at the time they com-
mitted their crimes has been prohibited in England since 1908.147
Turning to the behavior of juries, both the concurrence and the dissent cor-
rectly label the statistics ambiguous. Without more data it is impossible to deter-
mine exactly the proper interpretation of the statistics. However, the Court did
provide some guidance with its holding in Furman v. Georgia" that the arbitrary
and infrequent method of issuing the death sentence without any guidelines was
unconstitutional.
The Thompson Court noted that between 1982 and 1986, 1,393 offenders were
sentenced to death, but only five were younger than sixteen at the time of the com-
mission of their crimes.149 In 1987 alone, 419 juveniles under sixteen were ar-
rested for murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 150 compared to only five
sentenced to death in a four-year period, which seems to point to the fact that a
juvenile's being condemned to death is a rare event. Although these statistics do
not reflect the number of convictions, they do suggest that capital punishment sen-
tences of juveniles are arbitrary.
Another example of this arbitrariness and lack of guidelines is the initial proc-
ess by which a juvenile is transferred into the adult criminal system. Under most
waiver statutes, the court focuses on whether the youth will be responsive to reha-
bilitation and also on the danger he presents to society. 15 1 The court bases its deci-
sion whether to waive the juvenile to the adult system upon many factors.
1 52
However, there are no specific guidelines regarding the relative weight to be as-
signed to any particular factor. Typical waiver statutes have been criticized as
"broad strandless grants of discretion."5 3 Although juveniles may still have the av-
enue of appeal available, the subjective decisions and unbridled discretion allowed
to the court, again, bring up the same concerns that were addressed in Furman. 
154
As Justice O'Connor said in Thompson, there are many reasons that legislatures
may allow juveniles to be transferred to the adult criminal system, 15 but this does
146. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment ofJuveniles, supra note 38, at 379.
147. Id.
148. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
149. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
150. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPoRs: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 174 (1987).
151. Hill, Can the Death Penalty Be Imposed on Juveniles: The Unanswered Question in Eddings v. Oklahoma,
20 CRJM. L. BULL. 5, 28 (1984) [hereinafter Hill, Can the Death Penalty Be Imposed on Juveniles].
152. Id. at 28-29; see, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
153. Hill, Can the Death Penalty Be Imposed on Juveniles, supra note 151, at 29.
154. See supra note 148 and accompanying text; see also Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors:
Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 774 (1986) [hereinafter Note, The De-
cency of Capital Punishment for Minors].
155. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 850 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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not mean that they should be fully punished as adults."56 It very possibly means
only that the juvenile system lacks the adequate resources to deal with the particu-
lar juvenile. Even granting that the juvenile system is inadequate for the particular
juvenile, it does not mean that he is incapable of being treated or that he may never
be rehabilitated. 157
One major criticism of the transfer process is that it allows ajuvenile offender to
be transferred based solely on the particular crime charged, thus directly conflict-
ing with the philosophy of the juvenile justice system.1 8 This also conflicts with
Enmund v. Florida, which states that "[t]he focus must be on his culpability" in
committing the crime, not on the particular crime itself."9 As the mere existence
of a separate juvenile system demonstrates, juveniles are less culpable and respon-
sible for their crimes than adults. According to the principles of Enmund, juve-
niles, therefore, should not be subjected to the same penalty as adults. This does
not mean that juveniles should not be tried or punished in the adult system; rather,
it means that considering the lesser culpability of juveniles, "the death penalty al-
ways will be disproportionate punishment for children and adolescents."16
C. Culpability
Recognizing the criticisms of the concurrence and the dissent that not all juve-
niles are incapable of having the requisite culpability, this section will present so-
cial and policy reasons for applying a blanket per se rule against imposition of the
death penalty upon minors under sixteen years of age.
In the 1800's, social reforms began to establish a separate juvenile justice sys-
tem, and by 1925, all but two states had established some type of independent and
separate justice system for juveniles.161 The basic reasoning was that juveniles are
not totally responsible for their offenses and should not be treated as adults. 162 The
system was designed to meet the needs of children and to concentrate on rehabili-
tation. 
163
There are a number of reasons that minors are less responsible than adults.
First, "minors are less mature than adults," a fact that has been recognized by the
Supreme Court. 164 Second, "minors ...are less able to control their conduct and
to recognize the consequences of their acts . .. ",165 This is evidenced by the nu-
merous laws that are enacted treating minors' legal responsibility differently from
that of adults.'66 Minors are also still in their developmental stage, and statistics
156. Note, The Decency of Capital Punishmentfor Minors, supra note 154, at 771.
157. Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors, supra note 138, at 1478.
158. Id. at 1479 n.63; see also Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Ky. 1968) (imprisonment
without parole is cruel and unusual when applied to a juvenile of age fourteen).
159. 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
160. Comment, Capitol Punishment for Minors, supra note 138, at 1503.
161. Id. at 1474-75.
162. Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors, supra note 154, at 770.
163. Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors, supra note 138, at 1475.
164. Id. at 1493 n.132.
165. Id. at 1493.
166. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, app. 839-48 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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show that as they grow older "they commit fewer offenses, whether or not they are
apprehended . "..."167 Rebellion, risk-taking, peer pressure, and youth subcul-
tures virtually guarantee some type of criminal activity among a large percentage
of juveniles.
168
For those minors who may be so significantly advanced in their level of matu-
rity as to be culpable as adults, there are still reasons for their exclusion from the
death penalty. There is an accepted view that "juvenile crime results from environ-
mental factors for which society must share the blame .... 169 As recognized in
Eddings v. Oklahoma,170 " 'youth crime as such is not exclusively the offender's
fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure of family, school, and the social
system, which share responsibility for the development of America's youth.' "171
It seems to be a well-established belief that children are different from adults
and occupy " 'a very special place in life which law should reflect.' "'72 It seems
inconsistent with our legal system that a juvenile should be able to be arbitrarily
plucked from the protection afforded him by the juvenile system, based solely on
his criminal offense, and subjected to the penalty of death. To do so is nothing
more than paying lip service to the juvenile justice system and the interpretations
that the Supreme Court has given to the eighth amendment of the Constitution.
D. Retribution and Deterrence: Seeking to Justify the Death Penalty
The death penalty has been recognized as" 'serv[ing] two principle social pur-
poses: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders ...
"173 If the penalty, when applied to William Wayne Thompson, did not
measurably contribute to either of these goals, it would be " 'nothing more than
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering' and hence an uncon-
stitutional punishment." 174 This note will now present reasons that the death pen-
alty as applied to minors does not measurably contribute to either of the two social
principles recognized by the Supreme Court.
1. Retribution
Retribution is not a new concept in our society -the words "an eye for an eye"
have long been spoken among the members of our society. Retribution is premised
on the notion that the offender should get what he deserves, but it also provides an
167. Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors, supra note 138, at 1494.
168. Id.
169. Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors, supra note 154, at 770; see also Comment, Capital
Punishment for Minors, supra note 138, at 1495 n. 143.
170. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
171. Id. at 115 n. 1l.
172. Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors, supra note 154, at 776.
173. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion)).
174. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(White, J., plurality opinion)).
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avenue for society to vent its frustration and desire for vengeance against the crim-
inal.
175
The justification for retribution is the individual's culpability.176 Considering a
juvenile's lesser culpability, it is obvious that" 'they deserve less punishment be-
cause adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in
long-range terms than adults.' "177
Granting the premise that society shares the responsibility for juvenile crime,
society should not feel the need to execute juveniles when they go astray. In fact,
society should recognize that one of its institutions has failed and should apply the
same amount of legal protection after the crime is committed as before. It seems
inconsistent to establish a dual legal system to treat juveniles and to rehabilitate
them and then, when one strays and commits a serious crime, to ignore the juve-
nile system and execute him as though he were an adult. Even acknowledging that
there are juveniles that are beyond any hope of being rehabilitated, the justifica-
tions for imposing the death penalty simply do not apply to juveniles. Specifically,
the juvenile is less culpable than his adult counterpart; therefore, the justification
of retribution is inapplicable to the juvenile.
Transferring juveniles to the adult system has been criticized but is nonetheless
a recognized process. Even so, retribution has never been a justifiable basis or
factor in the transfer process. 7 The reason for transfer most likely is that the juve-
nile system lacks the proper resources to deal with some capital offenders. If retri-
bution is not recognized as a basis for subjecting a juvenile to the adult system, it
should likewise not be a justification for sentencing him to death in the adult sys-
tem.
2. Deterrence
Whether the death penalty serves as a deterrent has been an area of disagree-
ment among scholars and courts for many years. 179 Justices Brennan and Marshall
argue that no "verifiable general deterrent effect exists." ' There are two major
criticisms concerning deterrence, and these will now be discussed with particular
emphasis on how they apply to juveniles.
The Court in Enmund recognized that" 'capital punishment can serve as a de-
terrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation.' "181
Child development researchers and the Supreme Court have noted that juveniles
lack the cognitive ability and social experience to make mature, moral judg-
175. Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors, supra note 138, at 1506-10.
176. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800.
177. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n. 11 (1982).
178. Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors, supra note 138, at 1509.
179. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment of Juveniles, supra note 38, at 392-93.
180. Id.
181. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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ments.182 The Supreme Court has stated that " 'during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.' 83
Furthermore, it has been recognized that if a particular offender can be distin-
guished from the rest of society, failure to punish him will not diminish the deter-
rent effect on the rest of society.184 If potential murderers are going to be deterred
by the execution of an offender, it is most likely that they will be deterred if the
executed offender has characteristics with which they can readily identify.18
Therefore, executing minors will have no general deterrent effect on the adult pop-
ulation, and it is also doubtful that executing minors will have any deterrent effect
on juveniles.
Minors often display risk-taking behavior and develop an attitude of defiance
toward death. This is evidenced by activities such as the use of hazardous drugs
and alcohol, reckless driving, and responding to dangerous dares. 186 If a minor
ever consciously planned and thought about committing his crime, the death pen-
alty might, in the minor's eyes, propel him into a position that would gain him no-
toriety and respect from his peers, thereby making the crime of murder possibly
more appealing to the juvenile. 187
The most important consideration is the premise that juveniles will rarely, if
ever, consider the death penalty before committing their crime; therefore, no de-
terrent effect can exist. In an interview aired on ABC's World News Tonight on
April 15, 1985, Thompson was asked if he had ever thought about the death pen-
alty before committing his crime. His response was that he only had thoughts of
"playing ball or just hanging around with his friends. "188
This remark by Thompson could be interpreted as a result of various factors. It
could be interpreted as evidence of the juvenile justice system's failure to deter
him. It could also be interpreted as a failure of the criminal justice system as a
whole. It may also show that Thompson is a hardened youth who has no concep-
tion of right or wrong. What Thompson's remarks certainly show is that the death
penalty was no deterrent to him.
The second criticism of deterrence is that in order for deterrence to be effective
there must exist the certainty of receiving a particular punishment. 1 89 There are
two considerations which support the proposition that no certainty exists that aju-
venile may receive the death penalty. First, "[miost minors . . . do not think that
they will get caught," and available evidence shows that they usually are not
182. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment ofJuveniles, supra note 38, at 394.
183. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
184. Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors, supra note 138, at 1511.
185. Id. at 1510-11.
186. Id. at 1512.
187. Id.
188. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment of Juveniles, supra note 38, at 393 n. 179.
189. Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors, supra note 138, at 1512-13.
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caught. 90 Second, because of the subjective and arbitrary transfer system, ajuve-
nile is never sure that he will be tried as an adult. Further, if he does consider be-
ing tried as an adult, he knows his age will be a mitigating factor in his sentencing,
which further extinguishes the possibility in a juvenile's mind of receiving the
death penalty.' The foregoing reasons evidence a tenuous link between a juve-
nile, his crime, the juvenile system, the transfer process, the adult system, and,
finally, the sentence of death. As a result, deterrence can hardly find any justifica-
tion as applied to juveniles.
V. ToDAY's YOUTH-YESTERDAY'S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
When the social reformers of the 1800's pushed for the establishment of ajuve-
nile system to separate minors from hardened adult criminals and to rehabilitate
the minors, they could never have imagined the impact of drugs and gangs that
presently plague our nation's youth. However the system was established for the
protection of minors, and this concern is no less valid today. Minors are the chil-
dren of our society, and society must extend to them every possible chance for re-
habilitation so that they can become productive adults.
With the current poverty and unemployment levels, the gangs, and the lure of
easy "crack" money, juveniles are being exploited and are exploiting each other.
The original founders of the crack empire recognized early on thatjuveniles could
be their most valuable resource. With the temptation of being able to make thou-
sands of dollars per week, even children as young as nine"' are being lured into the
trade.
Juveniles do not receive mandatory sentences for dealing drugs, as would their
older counterparts. Additionally, they are rarely detained for any significant
length of time due to the lenience and lack of resources of the juvenile system. Ac-
cordingly, dealers are saved the trouble of training new workers; they only have to
wait a short time for the experienced ones to return.' 93 According to George Ro-
binson, Assistant District Attorney for Fulton County, Georgia, " '[t]here is no
provision under our law to mandate restrictive custody for these youths. They're
selling drugs, and we're just spanking them on the hands.' "194 These youths are
being tempted by, and awarded with, cars, gold, furs, clothes, large amounts of
cash, and "hero" status among their peers. In the inner cities, many families des-
perately need the money their young crack dealers bring in and actually encourage
their quitting school to deal.195 It is easy money; they see that they do not get
caught; and, when they do, nothing very severe happens to them.
190. Id. at 1513.
191. Id.
192. Hackett & Lerner, L.A. Law: Gangs and Crack, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 1987, at 35, 366.
193. Lamar, Kids Who Sell Crack, TIME, May 9, 1988, at 20, 22.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 23.
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These young dealers are also heavily armed with automatic weapons and are
not in any way hesitant to use them.196 They do not fully comprehend the value of
life and are an exceptionally dangerous drug-dealing force.197 They live for today
and make the best of it. They do not see into the future nor do they comprehend
that they may die an early death. 198 This ease of success for these young criminals
is largely facilitated by the juvenile justice system. It allows them to be smacked on
the hand and then to be let back out to resume operations. The legal system must
adapt to this crisis and readjust the penalty structure to allow these juveniles to be
adequately punished. The juvenile justice system should not be used to exploit the
nation's children.
The Court's decision in Thompson merely adds to the bargaining power of the
drug lords and increases the problem. Young dealers know that the juvenile system
protects them, and even if they are waived to the adult system, their worst fear now
is imprisonment. Normally, juveniles do not weigh the punishments involved be-
fore they act, but in the drug world, the experienced drug lords fully educate the
youngsters about their special place in the law. The drug lords use this as a recruit-
ing device by showing the youngsters that they can earn substantial amounts of
money, while having no fear of harsh punishment.
This is not to suggest that the death penalty should be applied to juveniles;
rather, it suggests that we should undertake an examination of how the juvenile jus-
tice system operates with regard to today's youth. Furthermore, this struggle with
the question of whether the system is a success or a failure is partly due to the fact
that juveniles have never fitted neatly into the criminal justice system and probably
never will. Thompson demonstrates this struggle to fit the juvenile into the system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Thompson plurality's decision has received many criticisms, it
survives as a sound interpretation of the eighth amendment's "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause. The plurality recognized that juveniles are afforded different
and special protections and treatments within the legal system. The plurality also
recognized juveniles' lesser culpability and responsibility, thereby making the
death penalty as applied to them "cruel and unusual punishment."
This issue is a moral one evoking powerful emotions within each of us. The plu-
rality was criticized for acting in accordance with its emotions, but even so, the
plurality found enough reasons to justify its decision as a rationally based judicial
interpretation of the eighth amendment.
Putting the moral issue aside, the decision of the plurality is justifiable. It has
been the history of this country to establish a dual legal system, thereby creating a
separate juvenile justice system in order to treat juveniles with special care in
hopes of rehabilitating them. This country adopted a Constitution that centers on
196. Id. at 24.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 27, 30.
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protecting the rights of citizens and, particularly applicable here, the underlying
premise of the eighth amendment-the dignity of all persons. It has also been the
history of this country to set examples and impress upon other countries the princi-
ples of democracy and protection of human dignity. We, as a country, are the fore-
runner in criticizing other countries for oppressive and undignified treatment of
their citizens. I
With these reasons in mind, it, therefore, is totally inconsistent with our coun-
try's principles that the United States be in the minority of countries that allow exe-
cution of minors. The practice of executing minors does not protect the dignity of
the nation's children; moreover, it does not protect the dignity of the nation. To
summarize what has been said, the following quote is offered:
The lesson is simply this: A decent society places certain absolute limits on the pun-
ishments that it inflicts - no matter how terrible the crime or how great the desire for
retribution. And one of those limits is that it does not execute people for crimes com-
mitted while they were children.'
99
J. David Clark, Jr.
199. Bruck, Executing Juveniles For Crime, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1984, at 23, col. 3.
1990]

